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Introduction

With the advance in technology, wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) performing sensing and communication tasks will
be widely deployed in the near future because they greatly
extend our ability to monitor and control the physical
environment and improve the accuracy of our information
gathering (Estrin et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2003; Kahn et al.,
2000; Reif and Wang, 1999; Sibley et al., 2002). Sensor
nodes can be deployed in inhospitable physical environment
such as battlefields, remote geographic regions, and toxic
urban locations. And now, sensors can be tiny and mobile as
they can be a group of mobile robotic insects sensing
dangerous areas or enemy targets and sending back as much
information as possible (Wood, 2007).
In WSNs, power in sensors is the scarcest resource. In
many situations, sensors cannot get recharged very often
after being deployed in the field. Therefore, power efficient
communication mechanisms are desired. As mobility
becomes readily available to sensors (Rodoplu and Meng,
1999), recent studies on using mobility as a control
mechanism to minimise energy consumption (Goldenberg
et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2007; Li and Halpern, 2001;
Wang et al., 2005, 2007) have been conducted. Several
mobility control protocols have been developed in which
mobile sensors are controlled to move to the most power
efficient positions for communication. These studies show
that the saved energy in communication can compensate for
the energy consumption in movement. Thereby, the overall
energy consumption of sensors is reduced. These protocols
also ensure that the communication among sensors will not
be disrupted when sensors are moving to their best
locations.
However, we observe that the existing protocols
converge slowly, i.e., it takes many rounds for the sensors to
move to their optimal locations because a sensor node
adjusts its position according to the positions of its
two neighbours. Thus, a lot of energy is wasted in
movement. To address this problem, we propose two new
mobility control protocols that can converge quickly while
keeping all the advantages of the existing protocols. The
mobility control protocol with quick convergence (MCC)
speeds up the convergence process by avoiding the
overreaction of a node to the movement of its neighbours,
while the mobility control protocol with fast convergence
(MCF) reduces the convergence time by moving the nodes
as close to their optimal positions as possible. The key idea
of our protocols is to use the optimal location information of
each relay node calculated by algorithm mobility control

with minimum total moving distance (MCM) as a guide for
mobility control. Experimental results show that this
information allows the mobility control process to converge
quickly. The idea of MCM is put forward in Goldenberg et
al. (2004). It is a lightweight algorithm that can be carried
out along with any routing protocol by simply appending a
counter and the location information of the source and the
destination to the routing messages.
Furthermore, the existing mobility control protocols do
not consider any security issue. In particular, the security of
the sink node has never been discussed. The sink node in a
WSN is crucial for gathering, aggregating, transferring and
processing sensor information. If a sink node is located and
destroyed, the network covered by the destroyed sink node
will not function. Although we notice that some existing
security schemes for WSNs can be used to prevent packets
from being eavesdropped or modified (Karlof et al., 2004;
Drissi and Gu, 2006) and to secure credentials used in
mobility control (Eschenauer and Gligor, 2002; Zhu et al.,
2003), the current mobility control protocols are risk free for
attackers to obtain the sink location information, because
mobility control protocols yield the location information of
the sink node to mobile sensors. Attackers can compromise
some nearby nodes to obtain sink location. Such attacks can
be launched by attackers anywhere, even far away, from the
sink node without exposing the attackers themselves.
Therefore, protecting the location of the sink node is one of
the critical security issues to safeguard WSN operations.
Thereby, we identify this issue as sink location privacy
which is defined as hiding the location of the sink node.
However, the sink location information can be hardly
protected using existing security mechanisms. At the same
time, a scheme for sink protection should not affect normal
sensing, communication and mobility control tasks that
require the knowledge of the sink location. To address this
privacy issue, we propose a novel privacy-preserving
scheme, called sink-anonymity scheme (SAS) that only
discloses the location information of dummy sinks and hides
the real sink in a Φ-anonymity area to deceive attackers.
The contributions of the paper are four-fold. First, our
mobility control protocols MCC and MCF converge much
faster and reach nearly optimal results, compared with the
existing mobility control protocols. Second, our protocols
are fully distributed in that they use only one hop
neighbourhood information, and they are proved to maintain
the connections between a node and its neighbours. Third,
the privacy of the sink location is a unique issue in mobility
control. It has not been given much attention in the sensor
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network research field. Most security and privacy related
research focuses on secure routing, key management, source
privacy and denial of service. Fourth, the SAS is the first
work to address the sink location privacy issue in mobility
control. The scheme does not disclose the sink location, or
any information to help attackers derive the sink location.
We show that it has Φ-anonymity on the sink location and
can be readily integrated into existing mobility control
protocols to enhance their security.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
summarises existing mobility control protocols and related
privacy issues in WSNs. Section 3 provides the preliminary
information on mobility control. Section 4 presents
two novel mobility control protocols with fast convergence.
Section 5 describes the privacy-preserving scheme and
proves its Φ-anonymity on the sink location. Section 6
shows how to apply the privacy scheme in the current
mobility control protocols. Section 7 presents the results of
simulation and analysis on performance. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.

2

Related works

2.1 Mobility control
Power-efficient topology control and routing protocols
(Perkins, 2000; Royer and Toh, 1999) have been well
studied in the past years. A few recent studies (Goldenberg
et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2007; Li and Halpern, 2001; Wang
et al., 2005, 2007) have showed the feasibility of using
mobility as a control primitive to minimise power/energy
consumption in networks of mobile sensors. In Goldenberg
et al. (2004), the authors prove that in a single active flow
between a source and a destination pair, if the energy cost
function is a non-decreasing convex function, the optimal
positions of the relay nodes must lie entirely on the line
between the source and destination, and that the relay nodes
must be evenly spaced along the line. Based on this, despite
the randomness of the initial deployment, if nodes can move
toward their optimal locations under mobility control, the
energy consumption in communication can be minimised.
Following the work, a few mobility control protocols
have been proposed and implemented. Synchronous and
asynchronous mobility control algorithms (Goldenberg
et al., 2004) let relay nodes reach their optimal locations
based on the averaging algorithm (Jadbabaie et al., 2003;
Rao et al., 2003). In brief, each node’s optimal location is
the average of its left and right neighbours’ locations. The
left and right neighbours of a node refer to the left and right
neighbours on the line between the source and the
destination. Thus, a node moves along with the movement
of its two neighbours. The algorithms are simple: they only
require one hop local information to be exchanged between
a node and its left and right neighbours, and are distributed,
which is suitable for a mobile environment. Also, the
authors prove that the movement of a node in this way will
not break the connections between the node and its
neighbours. However, Jiang et al. (2007) find a problem in
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the algorithms: nodes may oscillate around their optimal
locations and deplete their energy. A solution using a
predefined threshold δ is provided (Jiang et al., 2007) to
address the problem so that nodes will stop moving when
the distance between the node’s current location and the
next location is no greater than the threshold.
As discussed before, these protocols do not make nodes
move quickly to their optimal locations. Instead, many
rounds of movement are needed for them to reach their final
locations. Such slow convergence is a negative factor to
justify the effectiveness of the mobility control primitive in
power-efficient communication. Our protocols will address
this critical issue.

2.2 Privacy
Privacy research was mainly conducted in the context of
information privacy and anonymisation. For example, a
packet or a traffic pattern should not disclose identity
information. Anonymous communication is one of the main
research topics (Reed et al., 1998; Chaum, 1981). In this
type of communication, a series of intermediate systems
(mixes) are deployed. Each mix accepts messages from
multiple sources, performs one or more transformations on
them, and then forwards them in a random order. This
method can hide the source and destination addresses in IP
routing when being deployed in the internet. However,
it is not suitable in mobility control, because location
information is not identity information.
A few schemes (Xi et al., 2006; Mehta et al., 2007;
Kamat et al., 2005) have been proposed on source location
privacy in sensor networks. Their defence objective is to
protect the object that is being monitored by sensors.
Because the object being monitored is usually around the
source nodes that are sending information back, attackers
can locate the object by locating the source nodes. Hence,
their schemes are focused on how to hide the locations of
the source nodes. The main ideas of these schemes can be
summarised as follows:
1

each source node floods packets through numerous
paths to the base station to make it difficult for an
adversary to trace the source

2

each real source node is associated with a few other
(real or fake) source nodes so that they all generate
packets at the same time to confuse attackers

3

a source node sends a packet in a looping path that goes
through the base station so that attackers will get lost in
it

4

all source nodes periodically send back packets
regardless of whether they are monitoring the object or
not

5

a set of virtual objects are put in the field to simulate
the behaviour of the real object so as to hide it.

In this paper, we are interested in sink location privacy.
Because the sink node in a sensor network is crucial for
gathering, aggregating and transferring sensor information,
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if the location of the sink node is disclosed and the sink is
destroyed, the functionality of a sensor network can be
sabotaged. The problem of sink location privacy in mobility
control is apparently different from the source location
privacy in that the sink node is usually the destination of
routes in WSNs. We cannot simply use fake sink nodes
distributed in the network to hide the real sink location,
because all packets need to reach the real sink node. Even if
fake sink nodes can forward packets to the real sink node,
attackers can still try to locate the sink node by locating the
fake sink nodes first. Hence, new schemes are needed to
ensure the privacy of the sink node in mobility control
protocols.

3

L∗ ( ui ) = L( s ) + i ×

3.1 Assumptions
We assume that all sensor nodes have the same transmission
range R. If two sensor nodes are within each other’s
transmission range, they can communicate directly and they
are called neighbours. Otherwise, they have to rely on
intermediate nodes to relay messages for them. We define a
WSN as a graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of all sensor
nodes and E is the set of all edges between pairs of sensor
nodes. If two sensor nodes can communicate directly, there
is an edge between them in G. The location of each node u
is (xu, yu), simply denoted as L(u). |L(u) – L(v)| is the
physical distance between two nodes u and v. L′(u ) denotes
the target location of u in its movement and L*(u) is the
optimal location of u.
We assume neighbours can share their location
information by exchanging short messages. Location
information can be discovered by GPS or some GPS-free
positioning algorithms such as the one in Capkun et al.
(2001). To simplify the discussion, we describe the
protocols in a synchronous, round-based system, where each
mobility control message is sent and received in the same
round. All the protocols presented in the paper can be
extended to an asynchronous system. However, to make our
protocols clear, we do not pursue the relaxation.
We assume that a path from the source s to the
destination d has already been discovered using a routing
protocol, e.g., a greedy routing protocol or one of the ad hoc
routing protocols. We also assume that both s and d are not
moving during the process. Otherwise, the path is always
broken and a new routing path needs to be established.

3.2 Mobility control
Denote the location of the source s as L(s), the location of
the destination d as L(d), and the intermediate relay nodes as
ui for i ∈ [1, n – 1]. Accordingly, u0 is source s and un is
destination d. According to Goldenberg et al. (2004), the
optimal location L*(ui) of ui can be calculated as

(1)

Algorithm MCM (Goldenberg et al., 2004): Mobility control
with minimum total moving distance.
1:

The source node s sends L(s) and its label 0 to u1. When
each relay node ui receives L(s) and the label i – 1, it will
pass L(s) and its own label i to the succeeding node along
the path. Such a propagation will end at d.

2:

Once L(s) is received at the destination node d, d sends a
message carrying L(d) back to s along the path.

3:

At each relay node ui, once both L(s) and L(d) are
L(d ) − L( s)
received, set L∗ ( ui ) = L( s ) + i ×
and move ui
n
*
to L (ui).

Preliminary

In this section, we introduce the background of mobility
control protocols.

L(d ) − L( s)
n

The details of the algorithm are presented in
Algorithm MCM here. Algorithm MCM has a very nice
property: the total moving distance of nodes in MCM is
minimum because each node can move to its optimal
location in one hop. However, this can create a problem: the
movement can break the connections between a node ui
and its neighbours. For example, suppose nine nodes
u0, u1, ⋅⋅⋅, u8 are aligned in a line (see Figure 1). Node u0 is
the source and u8 is the destination. The transmission range
of each node is 10. Node ui (i ∈ [0..4]) is at location i.
Node u5 is at location 14, node u6 is at 23, node u7 is at 32
and node u8 is at location 41. According to Algorithm
MCM, the optimal location of relay node ui should be
L*(ui) = 0 + (41 – 0) = 8 ∗ i. Therefore, the optimal location
of node u5 (denoted as L∗5 ) is 25.625. If node u4 is still at its
old location 4 when node u5 moves to its optimal location,
the connection between them is lost. When neighbours are
disconnected, the data sent is lost and has to be resent from
the source after timeout. The neighbours have to reconnect
through sending each other Hello messages. As indicated in
Cortes et al. (2004), Mao and Wu (2005), and Poduri
and Sukhatme (2004), all of these will decrease the
communication efficiency.
Figure 1

Broken link between u4 and u5 in MCM
L*5

0

1

2

3

4

U0 U1 U2 U3 U4

14
U5

23 25.625
U6

32

41

U7

U8

To address the disconnection problem, a distributed
algorithm that allows the relay nodes to move to their
optimal positions is introduced as shown in Algorithm MCD
(Goldenberg et al., 2004). The key ingredient of this
algorithm is the simple average calculation. A relay
node always only moves toward the average of its
two neighbours, instead of reaching its optimal location in
one round. Value g in the algorithm is a damping factor that
prevents a node from overacting to the movement of its
two neighbours. It is proved (Goldenberg et al., 2004) that
the connection between communicating neighbours using
MCD will not be broken.

Fast mobility control protocols with sink location protection in wireless sensor networks
Algorithm MCD (Goldenberg et al., 2004): Mobility control at
each relay node ui.

4

1:

Exchange L(ui) with ui–1 and ui+1.

2:

Receive L(ui−1) and L(ui+1). Set
L ( ui −1 ) + L ( ui +1 )
.
L′ ( ui ) =
2

3:

Set damping factor g a random value ∈ (0, 1], move
toward L ( ui ) + g × ( L′ ( ui ) − L ( ui ) ) .

Fast convergence mobility control protocols

In this section, we first describe our motivation to develop
fast convergence mobility control protocols by pointing out
the problems of MCD and then propose two mobility
control protocols, MCC and MCF, to let nodes move to their
optimal locations much more quickly.

4.1 Oscillation and slow convergence of MCD
Although Algorithm MCD can make nodes move to their
optimal locations, it suffers from oscillation and slow
convergence problems as explained in the following
example.
In Table 1, there are six nodes, including the source and
the destination. The transmission range of each node is 10.
Suppose they are placed in a line and the y coordinate of
each node is the same. Therefore, in the table, only the x
coordinate of each node is shown. Round 0 displays the
initial location of each node. Starting from round 1, each
relay node uses MCD (suppose g is set to 1) to calculate its
optimal location. From the table, we can see that the
process for each node to reach its optimal location
converges slowly. It takes the nodes 53 rounds to reach their
close-to-optimal locations. Then, the nodes start to oscillate
around their close-to-optimal locations and never stop. This
kind of oscillation is caused by the round-off errors in
computers. It wastes computation resources and will deplete
the energy in nodes very quickly.
The oscillation problem can be easily solved by setting a
threshold δ (Jiang et al., 2007) such that if the difference
between node ui’s target position L(ui ) and the current
position L(ui) is less than δ, the node does not have to move
any more.
To tackle the slow convergence problem without
loosing the connectivity between communicating
neighbours, we propose two mobility control protocols
MCC and MCF. Both protocols use the optimal locations of
the relay nodes calculated by MCM as a guide for nodes
movement.

still uses the average calculation in MCD. The difference is
that in MCD, a node will move as the locations of its left
and right neighbours change. However, in MCC, a relay
node knows its optimal position by MCM, and if the
distance between its new position (which is calculated as the
average of its two neighbours’ positions) and its optimal
position is larger than the distance between its current
position and its optimal position, it does not move. In this
way, a node can avoid unnecessary movement. Therefore,
the time it takes to complete the convergence process can be
reduced.
Note that the MCM part of the algorithm only needs
to be called once if the locations of the source, the
destination, and the label of each relay node do not change
for a period of time. It is used here to calculate the optimal
locations of relay nodes, not making them move
immediately to those locations. So, it will not cause the
disconnection problem. The actual movement is done in the
loop part of MCC. The calling of MCM does not create
much overhead because it can be incorporated into the
routing process. When source s sends a message to d, it
can also send its L(s) and its label 0 along with the
message. Each intermediate node will do the same thing
until the message reaches d. Then d sends an
acknowledgment plus its L(d) back to s. When each relay
node ui has L(s), L(d) and its label, it can calculate its
optimal position. After nodes reach their optimal locations,
according to Goldenberg et al. (2004), the subsequent
routing energy consumption can be minimised. It can be
proved that the connectivity of communicating neighbours
is kept in MCC.
Algorithm MCC: MCM combined with MCD.
1:

Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L*(ui) for each
intermediate node ui.

2

repeat

3

for each intermediate node ui at round t do

4

Exchange the location Lt–1(ui) reached in the last
round t – 1 with ui–1 and ui+1.

5:

Receive Lt–1(ui–1) and Lt–1(ui+1). Set
L ( u ) + Lt −1 ( ui +1 )
Lt ( ui ) = t −1 i −1
.
2

6:

If |Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| < |Lt–1(ui) – L*(ui)| and
|Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui).

7:

end for

8:

until all nodes have no further movement.

Figure 2

Illustration of Theorem 1

*

L1

u3

u’2
4.2 Protocol MCC
The first protocol MCC combines the ideas of MCM
and MCD (details shown in Algorithm MCC). This protocol
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Table 1
Round

The slow convergence process and oscillation of nodes to reach their optimal locations
sx

node1x

node2x

node3x

node4x

dx

0

92.11134

86.99914

80.11193

74.99975

69.11155

63.99937

1

92.11134

86.11163

80.99944

74.61174

69.49956

63.99937

2

92.11134

86.55539

80.36169

75.24949

69.30556

63.99937

3

92.11134

86.23651

80.90244

74.83362

69.62444

63.99937

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

53

92.11134

86.48894

80.86656

75.24416

69.62177

63.99937

54

92.11134

86.48895

80.86655

74.24417

69.62176

63.99937

55

92.11134

86.48894

80.86656

74.24416

69.62177

63.99937

56

92.11134

86.48895

80.86655

74.24417

69.62176

63.99937

57

92.11134

86.48894

80.86656

74.24416

69.62177

63.99937

58

92.11134

86.48895

80.86655

74.24417

69.62176

63.99937

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

Theorem 1: Connectivity is kept between communicating
neighbours in MCC.
Proof: Without loss of generality, in our proof, we need to
cover cases where a node will move with the location
changes of its two neighbours and cases where a node will
not move if the new location is farther away from its
optimal location than its current location. To cover both
cases, we come up with a network as shown in Figure 2.
There are five relay nodes u0, u1, ⋅⋅⋅, u4. For convenience’s
sake, the labels of the nodes are also used for their locations.
A solid line between two nodes indicates that they can
communicate with each other directly. An undirected
dashed line is used to indicate the distance between them.
And a directed line represents the movement of a node.
MCM calculates the optimal locations of the relay
nodes. In the figure, only the optimal location ( L1∗ ) of node
u1 is shown. Node u1 is the one that will not move because
its new location which is at the midpoint of u0 and u2 is
farther away from its optimal location. All others will move
to their new locations, that is, node u2 will move to u2′
which is the midpoint of u1 and u3, and node u3 to u3′ which
is at the middle of u2 and u4.
Now, we want to prove that the connections of nodes in
their new locations are not lost. That is, | u1 − u2′ | and
| u2′ − u3′ | are less or equal to the transmission range R.
First, we prove that | u1 − u2′ |≤ R is true. Obviously in
triangle u1u2u3, either | u1 − u2 |≥| u1 − u2′ | is true or
| u2 − u3 |≥| u2′ − u3 | is true. Since | u1 − u2′ |=| u2′ − u3 |,
|u1 – u2| ≤ R, and |u2 – u3| ≤ R are true, | u1 − u2′ |≤ R is also
true.
Next, we prove that | u2′ − u3′ |≤ R is true. Denote the
midpoint of u2u3 as u23. | u2′ − u3′ |≤| u2′ − u23 | + | u3′ − u23 |=
1
(| u1
2

− u2 | + | u3 − u4 |) ≤ 12 ( R + R ) = R. So | u2′ − u3′ |≤ R is

true.
Therefore, the connectivity is not lost in Algorithm
MCC.

4.3 Protocol MCF
The second protocol MCF also uses MCM to obtain the
optimal location for each relay node. The idea is that the
relay nodes should move toward their optimal locations as
much as possible without breaking the connections with
their left and right neighbours. In this way, for each node,
there is no extra movement. The details of this algorithm are
shown in Algorithm MCF.
Algorithm MCF: Move to optimal location as much as
possible.
1:

Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L*(ui) for each
intermediate node ui.

2:

repeat

3:

for each intermediate node ui at round t do

4:

Calculate target location Lt(ui) which is the closest
point to L*(ui) without breaking the connection with
ui’s left and right neighbours ui–1 and ui+1.

5:

If |Lt(ui) – L*(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui).

6:
7:

end for
until all nodes have no further movement.

In MCF, the target location Lt(ui) in each round t can be
easily calculated using a small program that solves
mathematical equations. Theorem 2 shows that the
connection between communicating neighbours is not lost
in MCF.
Theorem 2: Connectivity is kept between communicating
neighbours in MCF.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose there are four
relay nodes u0, u1, u2, u3 (see Figure 3). The area covered by
a node’s transmission range is represented by a dashed
circle in the figure. A solid line between two nodes indicates
that they can communicate with each other directly. An
undirected dashed line is used to indicate the distance
between them. And a directed line represents the movement
of a node. Node u1 has neighbours u0 and u2 while node u2
has neighbours u1 and u3. The optimal locations of nodes u1
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and u2 are L∗1 and L∗2 respectively from MCM. Now, node
u1 and node u2 will move toward their optimal locations as
much as possible without loosing the contact with their
neighbours. The new locations of nodes u1 and u2 are u1′
and u2′ as shown in Figure 3.
Now we want to show that the communication between
nodes u1 and u2 in their new locations is not lost, that is,
| u1′ − u2′ |≤ R. In Figure 3, in shape u1u2 u2′ u1′ , either
| u1′ − u2′ |≤| u1′ − u2 | is true or | u1′ − u2′ |≤| u1 − u2′ | is true.
Since | u1 − u2′ |≤ R and | u1′ − u2 |≤ R are true, so
| u1′ − u2′ |≤ R is true. This means that the communication
between nodes u1 and u2 in their new locations is still within
the range R.
Figure 3

Illustration of Theorem 2
L*1

L*2

u’2
u’1
u0
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Privacy preserving

In this section, we introduce a unique security issue called
sink location privacy in the proposed mobility control
protocols, and put forward a privacy preserving scheme.

Apparently, an attacker can obtain the location of the sink
node d by compromising any node along the path and then
destroy the sink. Therefore, a privacy preserving approach is
needed to hide the sink location.
The intersection attack exploits the geometric
characteristic of paths formed in mobility control. Because
the sink node places itself on the paths, attackers can infer
the actual sink location by locating nearby nodes in
two disjoint paths. This intersection attack is illustrated in
Figure 4, in which the sink is communicating with two
sources s1 and s2 via two disjoint paths. If an attacker can
find any two nodes on each of the two disjoint paths, the
attacker can obtain the two paths going through these nodes.
Then, the intersection of the two paths discloses the location
of the sink node. This attack allows attackers to obtain sink
location without cracking any packet of mobility control
protocols.
The challenge of defeating the two attacks and ensuring
the privacy of sink location is that traditional security
mechanisms cannot hide the sink location information. For
example, encryption of the sink location cannot prevent a
fully compromised node from disclosing the information
because an attacker can easily obtain all credentials (such as
keys) in the compromised node to decrypt any encrypted
information.
Sink location anonymity is different from identity
anonymity where attackers can eavesdrop packets
transmitted near them and find the identity information of
the sink node (such as its IP address). But this kind of
information cannot help the attackers to locate the sink
node. In this paper, we are concerned with the attacks that
attempt to discover the location of the sink node and destroy
it. Hence, the objective of our work is to hide the sink
location.
Figure 4

Intersection attack

5.1 Attacks on sink location
Mobility control protocols are susceptible to various attacks.
Many security schemes of authentication, encryption and
key management proposed in the past can be deployed in
WSNs to protect them. But this paper will not address
traditional attacks. Rather, we show two attacks (direct
attack and intersection attack) that can be hardly defeated
by current security countermeasures. The two attacks give
attackers an easy access to sink location without exposing
themselves. Using the two attacking approaches, attackers
do not need to physically trace along a path hop by hop to
the real sink node, but simply monitor nearby traffic or
capture a few nearby nodes at any place far away from the
real sink.
The direct attack exploits the fact that all mobility
control protocols need to send the sink location information
to the relay nodes. This is because MCC and MCF use
MCM where the sink node d includes its location L(d) in the
reply message when it sends acknowledgment back to the
source node s. After the reply reaches s, all the intermediate
nodes on the path will have the location information of d.

9

s2

s1
d

5.2 Dummy node
Our basic idea is to use a dummy node d ′ to hide the real
sink location information L(d) from all the nodes on the
path. Assume a sink node d is communicating with several
sources through multiple disjoint paths. After d receives the
source location L(s) from each source, it does not reply with
its real location L(d). Instead, the sink node picks a one hop
neighbouring node h and a dummy node d ′ for each
path such that h satisfies inequality (2) and d ′ satisfies
equation (3), where nx is the hop count of node x from the
source s and |L(x) – L(y)| is the distance between nodes x
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and y. Inequality (2) states that h’s best location is in the
communication range R of d so that d is one hop away from
the path that goes through s and h. Equation (3) states that
d ′, h and s are on the same path.
L( h) − L( d ) < R

L(d ′) − L( s )
nd ′

=

(2)

5.3 Φ-anonymity

L( h) − L( s )

(3)

nh

The idea of dummy node is illustrated in Figure 5, where d
communicates with two sources s1 and s2 via its neighbours
h1 and h2. Assume d has obtained s1’s location L(s1),
h1’s location L(h1), and the hop count nh1 between s1 and
h1. To hide its true location from s1, d picks a
random number nd1′  nh1 and computes the location
n

L(d1′) = ( L(h1 ) − L( s1 )) nd1 + L( s1 ) according to equation (3).
′

h1

Then, d claims a dummy sink d ′ at L(d1′) on the path and
nd1′ is the hop count between s1 and d1′.
Accordingly, d can make two dummy nodes for the
two disjoint paths as shown in Figure 5. d selects h1 and d1′
for s1, and h2 and d 2′ for s2. Although d is not on either path,
d claims that it is the next hop to hi on the path. Hence,
when h1 receives a packet from s1, it will forward the packet
to its next hop which is d. h2 will do the same thing after
receiving a message. Thereby, d can get information
delivered in both paths while using the dummy nodes to
counteract the direct and the intersection attacks on its
location.
Figure 5

Proof: Assume that two disjoint paths intersect at point x. x
must satisfy the path equations of the two disjoint paths.
Because the sink node is off both paths, the sink node does
not satisfy the path equation of either path. Therefore, the
intersection point x does not disclose the sink location.

In this section, we propose a formal privacy model to
analyse the achieved privacy. The model defines a proximity
area surrounding the real sink node, which shows the range
of the sink location that attackers can derive. The model can
help the sink node to compare the privacy when different
dummy nodes are selected.
As shown in Figure 6, we place the sink node at the
origin. Assume that attackers have found N disjoint paths.
Each path equation i is denoted as y = kix + ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Because all these paths pass inside the communication
range R of the sink node, the vertical distance from the
origin to any path is less than R. Hence, it must be true that
|ci |
1+ ki2

< R.

Similarly, in order to determine whether the sink node is
at the location (X, Y) or not, attackers need to compute the
vertical distance from the location (X, Y) to each path i using
di =

|ci + ki X −Y |
1+ ki2

. If all di satisfy inequality (4), i.e., the

distance from the location (X, Y) to any of the disjoint paths
is less than the communication range R, a sink node might
be at the location (X, Y).
Figure 6

Illustration of ΦP-anonymity

Y

Dummy nodes

d´1

d'2

ΦP

s1

...´
h1
...

d

s1
s2

...

h2

d
...´

Property 1: The dummy node does not disclose the real
sink location if any mobile sensor node on a path is
compromised.
Proof: Any sensor ui on a path between a source s
and a dummy sink d ′ knows the locations of them.
Compromising ui, attackers can obtain the path equation
as

y=

Ys −Yd ′
X s − X d′

R

d´2

( x − X s ) + Ys , where Xx and Yx are the

coordinates of node x. Since the sink node is off the path, its
location does not satisfy the path equation. Therefore, the
path equation does not disclose the sink location.
Property 2: The dummy node does not disclose the sink
location if the intersection points of any two disjoint paths is
compromised.

d'1
(0,0)

X

s2
ci + ki X − Y
1 + ki2

< R for 1 ≤ i ≤ N

(4)

In the example of Figure 6, the proximity area is the
shadowed area in which any position (X, Y) satisfies
inequality (4). Note that the proximity area covers the
locations of possible sinks that are more than one hop away
from the real sink node. As long as a location is within the
communication range of either of the two disjoint paths, the
location can be considered as the sink location. Hence, the
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proximity area is the achieved privacy against the two
compromised paths.
Given such a proximity area, we define Φ-anonymity
below. Accordingly, the proximity area in Figure 6 is a
ΦP-anonymity, where P is the set of the two disjoint paths.
Definition 5.1: Let Φ be a proximity area and P be the set of
all disjoint paths known to attackers. Φ is said to satisfy
ΦP-anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum proximity
area in which any location (X, Y) satisfies inequality (4) for
all paths in P.
Definition 5.2: Let Φ be a proximity area and P∗ be the set
of all disjoint paths known to the sink node. Φ is said to
satisfy Φ-anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum
proximity area in which any location (X, Y) satisfies
inequality (4) for all paths in P∗.
The relation of ΦP-anonymity and Φ-anonymity is shown by
Theorem 3 which indicates that attackers can reduce the
proximity area if more disjoint paths are known. The
smaller the proximity area is, the better estimation the
attackers can have on the real sink location. However, the
minimum proximity area that attackers can achieve is the
Φ-anonymity area.
Theorem 3: A Φ-anonymity area is the minimum in all
ΦP-anonymity areas, i.e., ∀ΦP, Φ ⊆ ΦP.

Figure 7

Proof: Assume we can find a P and a ΦP such that
Φ ⊆/ Φ P . Thereby, a location x exists that x ∈ Φ but
x ∉ ΦP. Hence, the location x is one hop away from all paths
in P∗. However, a path p ∈ P exists that x is more than one
hop away from p. Therefore, p ∉ P∗ and thus P ⊆/ P∗ .
However, because P is the set of all disjoint paths
known to attackers and P∗ is the set of all disjoint paths
known to the sink node, we know P ⊆ P∗, which
contradicts P ⊆/ P∗ . Therefore, the theorem is proved by
contradiction.

5.4 Sink-anonymity scheme
The Φ-anonymity area is critical to the privacy of sink
location given multiple paths. The larger the Φ-anonymity
area is, the better the real sink node is protected. According
to Definition 5.2, the shape and the size of the Φ-anonymity
are determined by P∗. In other words, the disjoint paths
selected by the sink node determine the privacy of the sink
location.
We propose two SASs (shown in Algorithms R-SAS
and O-SAS). R-SAS uses the random disjoint path selection
approach, while O-SAS uses the offset disjoint path
selection approach. By analysis and comparison, we show
that only O-SAS can preserve privacy given multiple paths.
And that is the one that will be embedded into our mobility
control protocols later.

Sink coverage and path selection approaches, (a) 45° (b) 180°

(a)

11

(b)

12
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To discuss the two schemes, we first model the
area covered by a sink node as a ‘fan area’, i.e., all sensor
nodes in the fan area report data to the sink node. Denote
the angle of the fan as θ. Figure 7 illustrates the fans of
θ = 45° and θ = 180° (the grey areas). When θ = 180°, paths
to the sink node may come from all directions. Thereby,
paths in a fan of θ > 180° are the same as paths in a fan of
θ = 180°. Note that the fan area of a sink node is normally
determined by network deployment or task assignment. We
assume the sink node has θ as a parameter in mobility
control.
R-SAS makes each selected path go through a randomly
positioned one hop neighbour and a randomly selected
dummy sink. O-SAS does the same thing, and, in
addition, makes all selected paths intersect at an offset
point x (the black dots in the bottom row in Figure 7).
Hence, in addition to equation (3) and inequality (2),
all the paths selected by the offset approach also
satisfy equation (5) which states that the offset point x is on
the paths. Note that x is neither a dummy node nor a real
node.
Algorithm R-SAS: Random sink-anonymity scheme.
1:
2:

for each requesting sensor s do
The sink node selects a neighbour h and a dummy sink
d ′ such that

To analyse the privacy achieved by R-SAS and OSAS, we
need to identify the Φ-anonymity areas in the proposed
schemes. Theorem 4 shows that R-SAS does not provide
any privacy protection to the real sink node if attackers
compromise sensors in sufficient disjoint paths. On the
contrary, Theorem 5 shows that O-SAS can achieve
Φ-anonymity to protect the sink location.
Theorem 4: Given multiple disjoint paths, the Φ-anonymity
area of R-SAS could be as small as the real sink node and
thus reveal the real sink location.
Proof: Because the sink node randomly selects dummy
nodes, it can possibly select two pairs of parallel paths
{ p1 , p1′} and { p2 , p2′ } as shown in Figure 8(a). From there,
let P be the set of { p1 , p1′ , p2 , p2′ }. Then, the sink node is
the only location that is in one hop to all paths in P. Hence,
ΦP includes only the sink node. Because Φ ⊆ ΦP as in
Theorem 3, Φ includes only the sink node.
Theorem 5: Let p1 and p2 be the two outmost paths in
O-SAS as shown in Figure 8(b) such that all paths in P∗ are
bounded by the two paths. The Φ-anonymity area of O-SAS
is the gray area in Figure 8(b) and does not reveal the real
sink location.
Proof: For any pi ∈ P∗, let Pi = {pi}. Find two parallel lines
lt,i and lb,i as in Figure 8(b) such that any point within the
two lines is one hop away from pi. Then, the area within the
two lines is the Φ Pi -anonymity area.

(a) h satisfies inequality (2),
(b) d ′ satisfies equation (3).
3:

5.5 Privacy analysis of R-SAS and O-SAS

end for

Algorithm O-SAS: Offset sink-anonymity scheme

We rotate pi from p1 to p2. For each instance of pi,
we find the corresponding Φ Pi -anonymity area. The

1:

The sink picks an offset point x in the offset area and
keeps the offset from x to d as a secret.

overlapping area of all the Φ Pi -anonymity areas, which is

2:

for each requesting sensor s do

3:

The sink node selects a neighbour h and a dummy sink
d ′ such that
(a) h satisfies inequality (2) and equation (5),
(b) d ′ satisfies equation (3).

4:

two hops away from the real sink node, while any selected
path passing the offset point is one hop away from the real
sink node.

end for

Yx − Ys
Y −Y
= h s
Xx − Xs Xh − Xs

the grey area in Figure 8(b), is the Φ-anonymity area.
For O-SAS, the solid grey area in Figure 9 shows
where the sink node can select an offset point x. The
dotted area is where sensors are deployed. The farthest
distance between the offset point and the sink node is
R
. If θ ≤ 60°, the offset point could be more than
sin(θ /2)

(5)

Figure 7 shows examples of the ΦP-anonymity area (the
dotted areas) when attackers know a set P of five disjoint
paths. The dotted areas illustrate several privacy properties.
First, the actual sink node could be at any location within
the dotted area. Knowing the area does not necessarily
disclose the sink location. Second, the intersection of any
paths does not disclose the sink location. When a sink node
uses the offset selection method, the sink node can pick an
offset point in any direction to hide itself. Hence, the offset
point contributes no more information than the dotted area
to attackers.

Figure 8

Analysis of Φ-anonymity, (a) R-SAS (b) O-SAS

lt,i
p1

p1
p2
p'1

d

pi
x
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5.6 Comparison of R-SAS and O-SAS
We use three metrics to quantitatively measure
the Φ-anonymity of R-SAS and O-SAS: average
pe =

distance

pm = max(X,

∫

Φ

D( X ,Y ) dXdY ,

Y)∈Φ(D(X,

maximum

Y)) and area p1 =

∫

Φ

distance

dXdY , where

D(X, Y) is the distance of the location (X, Y) to the real sink
node.
Algorithm SAMCC: Sink-anonymity MCC.
The sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′ for each source
s according to O-SAS.

2:

d sends the location L(d ′) back to s via its neighbour h.

3:

Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L∗(ui) for
each intermediate node ui.

4:

repeat

6:
7:

for each intermediate node ui at round t do
Exchange the location Lt–1(ui) reached in the last
round t – 1 with ui–1 and ui+1.

9:
10:

R-SAS, 180
R-SAS, 90
R-SAS, 45
O-SAS, 180
O-SAS, 90
O-SAS, 45

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Lt −1 ( ui −1 ) + Lt −1 ( ui +1 )
.
2

If |Lt(ui) – L∗(ui)| < |Lt–1(ui) – L∗(ui)| and |Lt(ui) –
L∗(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui).
end for
until all nodes have no further movement.

pe basically tells how far away the centre of the
Φ-anonymity area is to the sink node in average. pm
indicates the possible farthest location to the sink node. pa
shows the size of the area where the sink node is. Therefore,
from a defender’s perspective, the larger the pe, pm and pa,
the better the privacy.
Figure 10 depicts the measurement of privacy in three
metrics. We study three situations, setting θ to 45°, 90° or
180°. We assume that the sink node has a few disjoint paths
ranging from 3 to 19 in its covered area. The results are
normalised as the communication range of the sink node is
set to 1. All data points are averaged over 30 random
scenarios generated in MATLAB.
First, the simulation confirms the privacy analysis of
R-SAS and O-SAS. O-SAS provides much better privacy
than R-SAS. As attackers obtain more disjoint paths, R-SAS
in fact reduces the area where the sink node could be. For
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Figure 10 Comparison of Φ-anonymity of R-SAS and O-SAS
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example, the area inferred from 19-disjoint paths in R-SAS
is only about 4.5% of the area inferred from three disjoint
paths. Thereby, attackers can estimate a very close location
to the sink if they can find sufficient disjoint paths. In
contrast, when O-SAS is used, the inferred area size reaches
a boundary and cannot be further reduced as the number of
disjoint paths increases. In other words, attackers cannot
obtain the exact sink location by continuously trying more
disjoint paths if O-SAS is applied.
Second, we observe that smaller θ implies better privacy
to the sink node. When the sink node collects information
from a smaller fan area, disjoint paths lay more parallel to
each other. Their one hop surrounding areas thus have a
larger overlap, which results in a larger Φ-anonymity area
that attackers can infer. Thus, the sink node is better
protected with a smaller θ. This observation gives guidance
to network deployment with mobility control. A sink node
is better deployed at the boundary of a network than at the
centre. A sink node is better assigned to monitor a part of
the network than the whole network.

Average distance (pe)

Figure 9
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Sink-anonymity mobility control protocols

In this section, we apply the O-SAS scheme to two mobility
control protocols, MCC and MCF, and develop two new
sink-anonymity mobility control protocols, SAMCC and
SAMCF, that protect the real sink node and ensure the
connectivity between communicating neighbours. We also
apply the O-SAS scheme to MCM and MCD. They will be
used in our simulation for comparison.

6.1 Protocol SAMCC
In SAMCC, the sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′
according to O-SAS for the intermediate nodes to adjust
their locations. An intermediate node knows its optimal
position using MCM. If the distance between its new
position (which is calculated as the average of its
two neighbours’ positions) and its optimal position is larger
than the distance between its current position and its optimal
position, it does not move. In this way, a node can avoid
unnecessary movement.
For a particular source s, once a dummy node d ′ is set,
all the real intermediate nodes between the source and the
dummy sink will move to their optimal locations. SAMCC
will not disconnect communicating neighbours during the
process. The complete algorithm is shown in Algorithm
SAMCC.
Algorithm SAMCF: Sink-anonymity MCF.
1:

The sink node d picks a dummy sink d ′ for each source s
according to O-SAS.

2:

d sends the location L(d ′) back to s via its neighbour h.

3:

Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location L∗(ui) for each
intermediate node ui.

4:

repeat

5:

for each intermediate node ui at round t do

6:

Calculate target location Lt(ui) which is the closest
point to L∗(ui) without breaking the connection with
ui’s left and right neighbours ui–1 and ui+1.

7:

If |Lt(ui) – L∗(ui)| > δ, then move to Lt(ui).

8:
9:

end for
until all nodes have no further movement.

6.2 Protocol SAMCF
The second protocol, SAMCF, selects a dummy sink as in
SAMCC. Once a dummy sink is chosen, the intermediate
nodes will move toward their optimal locations as much as
possible without breaking the connections with their left and
right neighbours. The details of this algorithm are shown in
Algorithm SAMCF.
As said in its protocol, SAMCF will not disrupt the
communication between neighbours when the intermediate

nodes are moving to their optimal locations once a dummy
node d ′ is set for each source s.

6.3 Protocols SAMCM and SAMCD
When O-SAS is applied to MCM or MCD, the real sink
selects a dummy sink like the previous two protocols, and
then the intermediate nodes will move according to MCM
or MCD. SAMCM cannot guarantee the connectivity
between communicating neighbours, and SAMCD has a
slow convergence process. The oscillation problem in MCD
is still solved by a threshold δ. They are included here for
comparison in the next section.

7

Simulation and performance analysis

7.1 Simulation settings
We implement the sink-anonymity mobility control
protocols (SAMCC, SAMCF, SAMCM and SAMCD) using
a self-implemented simulator written in C language. In this
paper, we focus on the mobility control model that is not
affected by traffic patterns and throughput. Instead of using
simulators such as NS2 and Omnet++, our simulator is
sufficient for conducting experiments and obtaining results.
We conduct experiments using various network settings
with different parameters. The initial locations of nodes are
randomly generated in a 100 × 100 area. The number of
nodes is set to 5, 10, 15 or 20, including the source and the
destination. The communication range R is 20 or 40
(Wu et al., 2006). The performance measurements are
averaged over 10,000 experiments.
The performance of these protocols is measured by three
metrics: convergence speed, energy consumption in node
movement, and the communication cost. The convergence
speed is obtained by the number of rounds of node
movement needed to achieve stabilisation. The energy
consumption in node movement is measured as the total
moving distance of nodes. The communication cost of
mobility control is calculated by the total number of
messages exchanged between nodes.

7.1.1 Simulation results on convergence
Figure 11(a) and Figure 11(e) show the number of rounds of
node movement for different algorithms when the
communication range is set to 20 or 40 respectively with
various node numbers. In the figures, SAMCD has the most
rounds of node movement, SAMCC has less, SAMCF and
SAMCM have the least. SAMCM has the fastest
convergence because it allows nodes to move to their
optimal locations in one round. In both figures, we can see
that the curves of SAMCF almost overlap with those of
SAMCM. This shows that SAMCF can converge
surprisingly fast. It almost reaches the optimal result of
SAMCM.
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7.1.2 Simulation results on total moving distance
Figure 11(b) and Figure 11(f) show the total moving
distance of nodes during the convergence process using
different algorithms when the communication range is 20 or
40 respectively with various node numbers. The results in
these two figures match those of the number of rounds of
node movement. One good result is that SAMCF is so close
to SAMCM in terms of total moving distance that their
curves are almost overlapped in the figures. As we know,
SAMCM achieves the minimum total movement. Therefore,
the total movement using SAMCF is extremely close to the
minimum.

7.1.3 Simulation results on communication cost
Now, we look at the communication cost of these protocols.
As shown in Figure 11(c) and Figure 11(g), the results of
the communication cost match those of the number of
rounds and total distance of node movement. SAMCD has
the highest cost, SAMCC is the next, and SAMCF is very
close to SAMCM which has the lowest cost.
In summary, these results show how good
SAMCC and SAMCF are compared with SAMCM and
SAMCD in convergence speed, energy consumption, and
communication cost. This is especially true for SAMCF,
which nearly reaches the best results of SAMCM.

7.2 Effects of embedding O-SAS in protocols
In this section, we show how the added security scheme
O-SAS affects the convergence speed, total node moving
distance and communication cost of the original protocols.
First, the convergence speed. When O-SAS is integrated
into MCD, MCM, MCC and MCF, the resulting
sink-anonymity mobility control protocols SAMCD,
SAMCM, SAMCC and SAMCF will have the same
convergence speed as the underlying protocols. This is
because after a dummy sink is selected according to SAS,
the intermediate nodes between the source and the sink will
try to align themselves based on the position of the dummy
sink. This process is no different in terms of number of
rounds of node movement than using the real sink. So,
adding security in these protocols does not affect the
convergence property of them.
Second, the total moving distance. Similar to the
convergence speed, built-in O-SAS has little impact on the
total distance of node movement either.
Third, the communication cost. If O-SAS is integrated
into MCD, MCM, MCF and MCC, the communication cost
will increase as a result of extra message exchanges. We
calculate the increased communication cost (in percentage)
over each original protocol if security is embedded. From
Figure 11(d) and Figure 11(h), the communication cost
increases for all four protocols if security is used. The
communication cost of SAMCM increases the most: e.g.,
25% when the number of nodes is 5 and the communication
range is 20; SAMCF is the next; SAMCC and SAMCD are
the least. Since MCM and MCF are already low-cost

protocols, anything added on to them will cause a greater
increase in cost than those higher-cost protocols. As the
number of nodes increases, the percentages fall sharply.
Therefore, the built-in security will only bring trivial
communication cost to the original protocols.
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Conclusions

In this paper, two mobility control protocols with fast
convergence, MCC and MCF, have been put forward to
improve communication in WSNs. MCC speeds-up the
convergence process by avoiding node’s overreaction to the
movement of its neighbours, whereas MCF reduces the
convergence time by moving the nodes as close to their
optimal positions as possible. Both protocols have
embedded the information of the optimal locations of relay
nodes into the mobility control. In addition, we have
pointed out a unique privacy issue: the sink location
privacy. To protect the sink node, we have proposed a
new privacy-preserving scheme to free mobility control
protocols from attacks that locate and sabotage the sink
node. The privacy-preserving scheme obfuscates the sink
location with dummy sink nodes. Analysis has shown that
the scheme can effectively hide the sink location via
anonymity. The scheme has also been integrated into the
mobility control protocols without raising much additional
overhead. The simulation and performance analysis have
shown that the proposed privacy-preserving mobility
control protocols, with the sink node well-protected, can
reach near-optimal results in terms of convergence speed,
energy consumption and the communication cost. All of
these provide strong evidence of support in justifying
the effectiveness of using mobility control to reduce
energy-consumption to improve communication efficiency
in WSNs. In the future, we will extend this work to enhance
sink privacy with multiple path segments in mobility
control. That is, there can be communications between one
source and multiple destinations or between multiple
sources and multiple destinations. The solutions involve
resource sharing and competition. Another direction in the
future is to apply our model to real applications by
considering traffic and throughput in the network and verify
the performance by NS2 or Omnet++.
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